CBO and OMB projections, adjusted for inflation, show federal budget deficit under control by William G. DeWald
CBO AND OMB PROJECTIONS,
ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION, SHOW
FEDERAL BUDGET DEFICIT UNDER CONTROL*
William G. Dewald†
Introduction
The main point of this article is to illustrate how
standard measures of the federal budget deficit may
be deceptive inasmuch as they do not adjust the
budget for inflation. The article takes budget pro-
jections of the 1986 Congressional Budget Resolution
made in August 1985 by both the Congressional
Budget Office and the Office of Management and
Budget and deflates them, that is it expresses them
in inflation-adjusted terms. No attempt is made to
evaluate the quality of these deficit projections for
fiscal years 1986 through 1990. But even if the more
conservative of the two projections should prove to
be correct, what emerges from the analysis is the very
optimistic interpretation that the budget deficit prob-
lem, as defined by the budget offices, would essen-
tially be eliminated in real terms over the next few
years without the need to raise taxes or cut social
security benefits. This view is sharply in contrast
with the general interpretation of the budget deficit
problem that has appeared in the press. (See ac-
companying Box.)
Why Adjust Budget Deficits for Inflation?
It is extremely important to take inflation into
account in evaluating the real effect of deficits on the
economy. What appears to be a deficit may turn out
to be a surplus when adjusted for inflation. The real
budget deficit is the dollar deficit adjusted for the
effect of inflation not only in increasing the interest
rate at which the government borrows but also in
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necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Rich-
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reducing the real value of outstanding government
debt to be financed. The real deficit represents the
net claim on credit markets for funds to finance the
federal government. Eliminating the deficit in real
terms could free credit markets both in the United
States and other countries from supporting large
annual net flows of funds to the federal government.
1
Lower real interest rates both in the United States
and other countries would be a prospect to the extent
that deficits in recent years had kept rates extra-
ordinarily high.
2
Deflating the budget deficit removes the effect of
inflation on both the interest rate at which the gov-
ernment borrows and the value of its outstanding
debt. This amounts to recalculating government
interest payments in real terms. Suppose the govern-
ment borrowing rate is 10 percent and the outstand-
ing debt is $1,500 billion as is approximately true for
the current fiscal year. Nominal interest payments
thus would contribute $150 billion to the deficit. The
10 percent nominal interest rate includes an inflation
premium to compensate lenders for depreciation in
the real value of their claims to future repayment by
borrowers. Consequently an increase in inflation
would increase the deficit because inflation is re-
flected in nominal interest rates as in recent experi-
ence. On the other hand an increase in inflation
would decrease the real cost of financing government
debt because of two fundamental gains to the govern-
ment attributable to inflation. One is that it would
collect additional taxes from recipients of increased
interest income on government securities due to infla-
tion. The other is that inflation reduces the real value
of its outstanding debt, thereby reducing its claim on
1 
Gerald P. Dwyer, Jr., “Federal Deficits, Interest Rates,
and Monetary Policy,” Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking, Part II (November 1985), pp. 655-81.
2 
William G. Dewald, “Federal Deficits and Real Interest
Rates: Theory and Evidence,” Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta, Economic Review (January 1983), pp. 20-29.
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Jane Seaberry, “CBO Cuts Forecast on Deficits,” The Washington Post, August 16, 1985, p. El.
[ CBO Director Rudolph] “Penner’s enthusiasm for the resolution contrasted with remarks
by members of Congress. The leaders of the House and Senate Budget committees said the
resolution was the best that could be done under the circumstances, and high deficits would
persist unless taxes were raised or major benefits programs such as social security were cut.
“President Reagan said the budget compromise marked the beginning of the deficit-
reduction process and this week he vowed to seek deeper cuts in spending.”
Haynes Johnson, “The 134-Mile-High Stack,” The Washington Post, September 22, 1985, p. A3.
“The forecasters say the geometric symmetry of our debt will continue to circle neatly
ever upward. In 5 more years, on our present course, . . . the total national debt will have
jumped again from $2 trillion to $3 trillion, a tripling of the debt in less than a decade.
“Well, I leave it to experts in the ‘dismal science’ of economics to sort out the theoretical
and technical hows and whys of all this. But you don’t have to be an expert to get the meaning
of this blunt message. We’re hurtling pell-mell into debtor status at all levels of American
society, and no amount of smiles and soft soap from the White House can keep this news from
being understood.”
Helen Dewar, “Reagan Budget Policies Blasted on Both Sides,” The Washington Post, Septem-
ber 25, 1985, p. A2.
“Why is he [President Reagan] on tax reform when he should be on deficits? Why does
he undercut the [Senate] budget resolution? asked [Senator David F.] Durenberger [R-
Minn] in reference to Reagan’s spurning of a Senate budget that would have raised taxes and
cut Social Security to achieve larger long-term deficit reductions than Congress ultimately
approved.
“Similar rumblings on the deficit issue came during the weekly Senate Republican caucus
luncheon dominated by appeals for further action to contain deficits. These included interest
in a plan by Sens. Phil Gramm (R-Tex) and Warren B. Rudman (R-N.H.) to force spending
cuts sufficient to balance the budget by fiscal 1990.”
Bob Setter, Los Angeles Times, September 30, 1985, sec. 1, p. 4.
“Former budget director David Stockman called Sunday for a tax increase of at least $100
billion a year to help reduce the federal budget deficit and prevent what he called ‘traumatic
economic dislocations.’
“ ‘If we’re going to get out of this situation and restore any semblance of national solvency
and fiscal discipline, it’s going to take a very major tax increase, larger than we’ve ever had
or contemplated before,’ Stockman said.”
16 ECONOMIC REVIEW, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1985resources to finance expenditures. If the nominal
interest rate on government debt is 10 percent and
the marginal tax rate on interest income is 30 per-
cent,
3 as is approximately true today, the effective
interest rate on government borrowing which incor-
porates the feedback of tax receipts is only 7 percent
[10 percent x (1-.3)]. The effective borrowing
rate which incorporates a 4 percent inflation rate is
only 3 percent [10 percent x (1-.3) - 4 percent].
4
Essentially adjusting the deficit for inflation elimi-
nates $45 billion of the $150 billion of nominal inter-
est payments because of a feedback of taxes on inter-
est income and $60 billion because of depreciation in
the real value of the outstanding debt. Assuming the
noninterest part of the deficit (the so-called primary
deficit) was balanced, the deficit would not be $150
billion (the nominal interest payments on the debt)
but only $45 billion (the real after-tax interest cost
of financing the debt if the marginal tax rate is 30
percent and inflation is 4 percent). The effective
real interest rate on financing the government debt
would thus not be 10 percent but only 3 percent.
Federal Deficits and Debt, 1952-1974
Chart 1 records the nominal budget deficit as a
percentage of GNP. This deficit ratio typically has
risen during recessions and fallen during expansions.
Until 1975 deficits generally peaked during reces-
sions at about 2 percent of GNP as in 1953, 1958,
and 1971. There were occasional surpluses (negative
deficits) as in 1955-57, 1960, and 1969. Nevertheless
there were more and larger deficits than surpluses.
As a consequence the publicly held federal debt in-
creased from $218 billion in 1952 to $343 billion in
1974, a 2.2 percent average annual increase. But
GNP grew at a faster rate, 7.0 percent on the aver-
age. Chart 2 shows the ratio of publicly held federal
debt as a percentage of GNP. It fell from over 60
percent in 1952, a level that reflected financing
World War II and the Korean War, to a level of
less than 24 percent in 1974 before the onset of the
deficit problems that followed.
Bad News on the Deficit: Observations,
1975-1985
Charts 1 and 2 also document how dramatically
the federal deficit and debt picture changed from 1975
3 
U.S. Treasury Department, Private communication.
4 
William G. Dewald, “Government Deficits in a Gen-
eralized Fisherian Credit Market,” Departmental Memo-
randum, International Monetary Fund, August 30, 1985.
Chart 1
FEDERAL NOMINAL BUDGET DEFICIT
AS PERCENT OF GNP
through 1985. There were no surpluses and much
larger deficits relative to GNP than previously had
been observed, for example, 4.5 percent in 1975 and
an unprecedented string of about 5 percent deficits
the past four years. The publicly held federal debt
more that quadrupled from $343 billion in 1974 to
$1,522 billion in 1985, an 11.6 percent annual in-
crease. This was significantly more than the GNP
Chart 2
PUBLICLY HELD GOVERNMENT DEBT,
PERCENT OF GNP
FEDERAL RESERVE RANK OF RICHMOND 17growth rate. Consequently the ratio of publicly held
federal debt to GNP rose from a low of 23.9 percent
in 1974 to a high of 39.4 percent in 1985. That is the
bad news that still pervades the general perception of
the budget deficit situation in the United States.
Good News on the Deficit: Projections,
1986-1990
The good news is that actually implementing the
1986 Congressional Budget Resolution-which
promises to cut both defense and domestic spending
programs but to leave taxes and social security essen-
tially unchanged-would be enough to substantially
reduce budget deficits and start shrinking federal
debt relative to GNP. Additional domestic spending
cuts such as the Administration has proposed could
significantly speed the process. So would the tax
hikes favored by a number of Senators and Congress-
men.
Table I gives some sense of the magnitude of the
good news in the Congressional Budget Resolution.
In February CBO projected deficits of more than 5
percent of GNP with federal debt growing faster
than GNP as far as it could see. By contrast, in
August CBO projected that implementing the 1986
Congressional Budget Resolution coupled with its
own more optimistic assumptions about interest rates
would cut the deficit from 5.2 to 4.2 percent of GNP
in the current fiscal year and from 5.3 to 2.1 percent
Table I
CBO PROJECTIONS OF FEDERAL DEFICITS AND
DEBIT HELD BY THE PUBLIC, 1985-1990
(As a percentage of GNP)
Federal Budget Federal Debt Held by
Deficit to GNP the Public to GNP
February August February August
1985 5.6 5.5 39.6 39.6
1986 5.2 4.2 41.8 41.1
1987 5.2 3.7 44.0 41.7
1988 5.1 3.0 46.0 41.6
1989 5.2 2.5 47.9 41.1
1990 5.3 2.1 49.7 40.2
Sources: Congressional Budget Office, The Economic and Budget
Outlook, February 1985, Table E-2, p. 160; and Congressional
Budget Office, The Economic and Budget Outlook: An Update,
August 1985, Summary Table 4, p. xxi and Summary Table 5,
p. xxi.
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by 1990. Based on more optimistic assumptions
about both economic growth and reductions in federal
spending, in August OMB projected that the deficit
to GNP ratio would fall to a mere 0.3 percent by
1990. The CBO and OMB projections of the budget
deficit as a percent of GNP are plotted in Chart 1.
They show a significant decline in the deficit ratio,
but CBO projects the deficit declining by 1990 only
to 2.1 percent of GNP. Before 1975 this had repre-
sented not a relatively low but a relatively high deficit
ratio over the business cycle. Nevertheless, as Chart
2 shows, both CBO and OMB were projecting that
the debt to GNP ratio would peak and start to decline
beginning in 1988, thus restoring the normal peace-
time pattern of declining debt to GNP ratios that had
been observed from 1952 through 1974. An impli-
cation of these projections of declining debt to GNP
ratios is an elimination of the federal deficit in
inflation-adjusted terms as explained in the next
sections.
The ‘Real’ Good News: Real Deficits
Projected to End
This article explains why, when inflation is taken
into account, even the less optimistic CBO projec-
tions of a deficit to GNP ratio falling to 2.1 percent
by 1990 imply that the federal deficit in inflation-
adjusted terms would essentially be eliminated. The
more optimistic OMB projections imply significant
real budget surpluses in 1989 and 1990. Further
reductions in federal spending or increases in taxes
than embodied in the Congressional Budget Resolu-
tion would imply even larger surpluses.
Adjusting Deficits for Inflation: An Example
To lay the groundwork for calculating the real
budget deficit, consider some hypothetical numbers.
Suppose a borrower owes $20,000 and promises to
repay the principal and 5 percent interest ($1,000)
at the end of a year. What the $21,000 repayment is
worth in real terms depends on inflation. If inflation
were 10 percent, $21,000 would be worth only
$19,090.91 ($21,000/1.10) in inflation-adjusted
dollars. The borrower would have struck a good
bargain and the lender a bad one because the real
interest rate would have turned out to be a negative
4.5 percent (-$909.09/$20,000).
If inflation were correctly anticipated, lenders
would not accept such bad bargains. Suppose 10
percent inflation is expected and lender and borrower
negotiate a 15.5 percent nominal interest- rate. This
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Thus the real or inflation-adjusted return would be
only $1,000 ($23,100/1.10-1$20,000) which is a 5
percent real rate. The real cost of financing the
$20,000 of debt is not 15.5 percentbut only 5 percent.
The $23,100 of debt including nominal interest in
current dollars at the end of a year amounts to only
$21,000 of debt in inflation-adjusted dollars which
are dollars calculated to have the same purchasing
power as at the beginning of the year. To continue
the hypothetical example, the interest cost of financ-
ing his debt in current dollars or nominal terms
would be $3,100-his nominal interest cost. But the
change in his debt in inflation-adjusted dollars or
real terms would be only $1,000 which is the net cost
of financing the loan including both nominal interest
payments and depreciation in its real value.
Real Budget Deficit Calculations : 1952-l990
These very same principles apply in translating the
federal government deficit in current dollars into real
or inflation-adjusted dollars. The easiest way to do
this correctly is to calculate the real federal deficit
as the change in the inflation-adjusted (deflated)
value of the publicly held federal debt.
5 Federal
government outlays totaled $851.8 billion and reve-
nues $666.5 billion in fiscal year 1984. Its nominal
deficit was the difference which rounded out to $185
billion. Its real deficit was much less. The reason is
that 3.8 percent inflation reduced the real value of
$1,142 billion of publicly held debt outstanding by
$42 billion in inflation-adjusted dollars. Thus the
real deficit was only $136 billion, that is,
$185 billion - (.038-x.$1,142 billion)
1.038
in terms of 1983 prices. That is still a comparatively
large number. As shown in Chart 3, it is 4.0 percent
of real GNP. However, it is considerably less than
the 5.2 percent ratio of the nominal deficit to GNP, a
figure that does not adjust the deficit for inflation.
5 Federal debt held by the public is defined to include
Federal Reserve holdings. There is a close correspond-
ence, especially in recent years, between the amount of
base money held by the public and Federal Reserve
holdings of federal debt. Thus, federal debt held by the
public approximates the sum of privately held federal
interest bearing debt plus federal noninterest bearing
debt (base money). Inflation depreciates the real value
of both categories of debt and thus reduces the real cost
of financing the government.
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Michael Dotsey’s article in the previous Economic
Review
6 surveys the theoretical literature regarding
the effect. of budget deficits on the economy. He
explains how optimal deficits would account not only
for inflation as in the present article but also for the
business cycle and for secular factors affecting real
interest rates; The business cycle, as has been men-
tioned, is important to the extent that deficits nor-
mally rise when output is below normal as in the
early 1980s and fall when output is above normal.
Dotsey cites a recent Wall Street Journal article by
Robert J. Barro
7, a principal contributor to the liter-
ature on deficits, in which he estimated that the 1984
budget deficit ratio was not unusually high because
two percentage points of it was attributable to infla-
tion and about one and one-half percentage points to
cyclical factors. By comparison, the present paper
estimates the effect of inflation on the budget deficit
but makes no attempt to calculate the effect of other
factors. This is in keeping with CBO and OMB out-
year projections which do not account for the busi-
ness cycle but are averages that are expected to
prevail.
Chart 3 shows that real deficits were generally
much smaller than the nominal deficit over the years
1952-1985, especially when inflation increased so very
much in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Even though
inflation was comparatively low in 1953-1974, as
Chart 4 shows, adjusting for inflation makes a big
difference in the deficit picture. There were real sur-
pluses (negative deficits) in 16 of these 23 years in
contrast to only 7 nominal surpluses. In the years
since 1974 there have been no nominal surpluses at
all, yet there were real surpluses owing to high infla-
tion in each of the years 1978 through 1981. Sub-
stantial real deficits of 3 to 4 percent were encoun-
tered only in the years 1982 through 1985 when lend-
ers were finally demanding and getting interest
returns that compensated them: for actual inflation.
The effective after-tax real interest rate at. which
the government borrows is plotted in Chart 5.
8 The
6 Michael Dotsey, “Controversy over the Federal Budget
Deficit: A Theoretical Perspective,” Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond, Economic Review (September/
October 1985), pp. 3-16.
7 Robert J. Barro, “A Deficit Nearly on Target,” Wall
Street Journal, January 29, 1985, p. 32.
8
where
r = after-tax real interest rate
i = before-tax nominal interest rate
= tax rate
=  inflation-rate
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NOMINAL AND REAL FEDERAL BUDGET
DEFICITS AS PERCENT OF GNP
REAL AFTER-TAX GOVERNMENT
BORROWING RATE




reason why the net interest cost on government bor-
rowing is an after-tax interest rate is that the govern-
ment collects tax revenue from taxpayers who earn
interest on government securities. As mentioned, if
the government pays a 10 percent before-tax rate but
collects 30 percent of interest income in taxes, its
effective interest cost rate would be 7 percent [10
percent x (1-.3)]. It is essentially the same rate
at which taxpayers earn interest income. Taking
inflation into account Chart 5 shows that the after-tax
real interest rate on government securities was low,
generally negative, from the middle 1960s through the
1970s and early 1980s as inflation accelerated. Only
since 1982 have after-tax real rates at which the
government borrows and taxpayers lend been positive
and only since then have there been persistently high
real deficits.
By incorporating such effective real interest costs
of financing the federal government debt in calcu-
lating real deficits, Chart 3 shows how both the CBO
and OMB projections of budget deficits embodied in
the 1986 Congressional Budget Resolution would cut
the deficit in 1988-1990 to well within the range of
variation that was observed in the 1950s and 1960s
which is the main point of the present article. To
the extent that high real interest rates have been
associated with high real deficits, these projections
imply lower real interest rates in the future than
were observed in recent years. The calculations used
to adjust the CBO and OMB projections to inflation
are shown in the Appendix.
Conclusion
My conclusion is that implementing the Congres-
sional Budget Resolution would go a lot further in
cutting back government spending and deficits than
20 ECONOMIC REVIEW, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1985is generally understood. My argument has used get Resolution promises to accomplish a lot more to
CBO and OMB assumptions and projections, but alleviate the deficit problem than its authors seem to
expressed deficits in inflation-adjusted terms. The have recognized. Perhaps the budget resolution will
deficit picture may be even brighter than these figures be disregarded as has often been the case in recent
suggest when one considers that eliminating deficits years. But if it is implemented and if the economic
might spur real growth and cut government borrow- assumptions of CBO and OMB prove to be accurate,
ing rates more than have been projected by the then the federal budget deficit in inflation-adjusted
budget offices. In any event, taking account of infla- terms would be eliminated without the necessity of
tion, this article has shown that even CBO’s con- raising taxes or cutting social security benefits. May
servative assumptions, rather than OMB’s optimistic one conclude that application of the “dismal science”
assumptions, imply that the 1986 Congressional Bud- need not yield dismal results?
Appendix Table I
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE DEFICIT PROJECTIONS
(Fiscal Years, Billions of Dollars, and Percent)
Source: Congressional Budget Office, The Economic and Budget Outlook: An Update, August 15, 1985.
Columns:
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OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET DEFICIT PROJECTIONS
(Fiscal Years, Billions of Dollars, and Percent)
Source: Office of Management and Budget, Mid-Session Review of the 1986 Budget, August 30, 1985.
Columns:
(1) Table 2, p. 3.
(2) Figures are for the beginning of the fiscal year. 1984.86: Table 23, p. 39.
1987-90: Means of financing other than borrowing from the public assumed to be zero.
(3) Table 3, p. 5.
(4) Calculated from (3).
(10) Figures are for the end of the fiscal year. (2) ÷ (6).
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